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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support for 
four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy






















































































































































































The post-Cold War has been a period of civil disorder and of civil order. It has 
witnessed calls for a New World Order and signs of a New World Disorder. If 
Bosnia, Algeria, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Rwanda have reminded us of 
the breakdown of the state and of civil society, South Africa and the new 
democracies of Latin America have signaled that a true civil society with 
representative government can emerge in areas where once authoritarian 
governments with elaborate state security systems appeared to prove that “might 
made right.” Yet, in many parts of the Muslim world, civil society and 
democratization are under siege or in retreat. If some blame Islamic 
governments (Sudan, Afghanistan, and until recently Iran) and Islamist 
movements, others cite the intransigence of authoritarian states and the military 
(Algeria, Turkey, Tunisia) to tolerate and abide by the results of open electoral 
politics. At the same time, some political analysts and policymakers legitimate 
those who speak of an incompatibility of Islam and democracy or Islam and 
civil society, rooted in a clash of civilizational values.
A “selective” headline or crisis-oriented approach to Muslim politics, 
which focuses on the acts of extremists, from hostages and kidnappings in the 
Middle East or New York's World Trade Center bombing, has too often 
provided the lens through which Islam and Muslim politics have been regarded. 
It has equated Islam and all Islamic movements with violence and religious 
extremism and led some to speak of a “clash of civilizations” between the 
Muslim world and the West This perspective has become the convenient excuse 
for some in the West to equate Islam and Muslim civilization with 
authoritarianism or to declare that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Some 
Muslim rulers in the post-Gulf war period have used the threat of religious 
extremism to renege on promises of greater political liberalization and to restrict 
the development of civil society.
Islam, Democracy and Civil Society At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, democratization and civil society are common themes throughout much 
of the world. From the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the Middle 
East, Asia, and Africa, voices have been raised that call for power sharing 
(greater political participation, representation, and self-determination) and with 
it more emphasis on government accountability, the rule of law, and social 
justice. Non-state actors and organizations (NGOs), from political parties and 
trade unions to professional associations, educational, financial and medical 
services, women's and human rights organizations, have become more visible. 
Religion has been a significant factor in the reassertion of civil society in many 
Muslim societies. The creation of modern (and often authoritarian) states in the 
Muslim world which extend governmental control over state and society and 
over religion and religious institutions as well as the tendency to regard civil 



























































































in Islam. Islamic history provides examples of many non-state actors, 
institutions and organizations that served as intermediaries between the 
ruler/government and the people, between state and society. Religious 
endowments (waqf, pi. awqaj) supported schools, universities, hostels, hospitals, 
and social welfare activities. The development of Islamic law (shariah) itself 
was often the product of private individuals or scholars (ulama) and schools 
(madhab, pi. madhahib) that were independent of the state and indeed initially 
sought to limit and curb the power of rulers. Sufi brotherhoods (tariqahs) and 
masters (shaykhs or pirs) provided not only spiritual guidance but also 
significant educational and social services in Muslim societies. Finally, guilds 
played an important role in the economic and social life of Muslim cities. 
Professional groups or guilds were organized around trade and commerce. Their 
activities included “regulating the production of goods, maintaining a 
professional code of ethics, overseeing prices.” Guilds often relied upon religion 
and religious rituals for rites of initiation and celebration and to legitimate their 
origins and activities such as that of the market supervisor (muhtasib) who was 
responsible for the enforcement (hiabah) of public morals.
Contemporary Muslim Politics In the contemporary Muslim world, Islam 
has become closely associated with the emergence or expansion of civil society. 
While some Islamic activists and movements have sought to destroy or 
overthrow the state, many have commandeered or championed the institutions of 
civil society. Proclaiming Islam as the solution to the political and 
socioeconomic ills of their societies, Islamists have often constituted both an 
ideological alternative and, on the ground, a state within the state. They have not 
only challenged but also concretely responded to the failures and inadequacies 
of governments and elites by creating alternative non-governmental political, 
economic, and social welfare associations and institutions. Across the Muslim 
world, Islamically oriented political parties, professional associations, social 
welfare agencies, educational and financial institutions have proliferated in 
Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Turkey, Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia. Given the historic significance and 
centrality of Islam in Muslim life and its continued presence and vitality in 
Muslim societies, the relationship of Islam to democratization and civil society 
is both a timely and an important issue.
Islam & Modern State
For decades, analysis and understanding of the development of societies has 
been seen in terms of the modern state: its boundaries, legitimacy, institutions, 
and functions. The modern state has been exemplified by its growing power, 




























































































influence to outlaw or control the institutions of civil society. Authoritarian 
rulers have used the modern state to control both politics and society.
In recent years, social scientists and political analysts have debated the 
future of the nation state. Modern states and rulers have been challenged by 
opposition movements. Many are states, relatively recently created (post WWII), 
with artificial boundaries, often a legacy of European colonialism, whose rulers 
have tenuous legitimacy and are dependent for their stability on their military 
and secret police. Religious (nationalist and sectarian), ethnic and tribal warfare 
in Sudan, Bosnia-Herzogena, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Kashmir and the Central Asian republics have provided shocking examples of 
the fragility of the modern state.
Increasingly in recent years, analysis of Muslim societies, their problems 
and future, has been placed within the framework of civil society and 
democratization. The breakup of the Soviet Union and liberation of Eastern 
Europe and events within the Muslim world have led to a heated debate over the 
political future and possibilities of Muslim communities and societies. Both in 
the Muslim world and in the West, issues of the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy, of political participation, pluralism, women's rights, and tolerance 
are discussed and contested.
The Challenge of Islamic Revivalism
Despite significant differences, the resurgence of Islam as a significant socio­
political alternative reveals common causes and concerns. Among the more 
significant are: the failure of secular nationalism (liberal nationalism, Arab 
nationalism and socialism) to provide a strong sense of national identity, the 
need for independence from foreign influence and hegemony, and the ability to 
produce strong and prosperous societies. Governments (most of which are non- 
elected, authoritarian, “security states”) have failed to establish or strengthen 
their political legitimacy. They have been criticized by opposition voices for a 
failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency or prosperity, to stem the growing 
gap between rich and poor, to halt widespread corruption, liberate Palestine, 
resist Western political and cultural hegemony. Both the political and religious 
establishments have been criticized: the former as a minority of western, secular 
elite more concerned with power and privilege, and, in the Sunni Muslim world, 
the latter as a religious leadership coopted by governments who often support or 
control mosques and religious universities and institutions.
Political Islam is in many ways the successor of failed nationalist 
programs. They included: the failure of Arab nationalism/socialism, signaled by 




























































































Bangladesh civil war of 1971; the shattering of the Lebanese confessional 
mosaic by its civil war (mid-70s to 1990); and economic failures in North 
Africa, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan in the latel980s and early 1990s. Many 
founders of Islamic movements were formerly participants in nationalist 
movements: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's founder, Hasan al-Banna, 
Tunisia's Rashid Ghannoushi of the Renaissance Party), Algeria's Abbasi 
Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey's 
Welfare Party.
Islamic movements have offered an Islamic solution, a third alternative to 
capitalism and communism. They argue that a modern Western bias or 
orientation, secularism and dependence on Western models of development, 
have proven politically inadequate and socially corrosive, undermining the 
identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies. Islamists assert that Islam is not 
just a collection of beliefs and ritual actions, but a comprehensive ideology or 
framework for Muslim society. Islam embraces personal as well as public life. 
Islamists call for the implementation of Islamic law, the Shariah, as the 
comprehensive blueprint for society. While the majority seek to work within the 
system, to bring about change from within society, a small but significant 
minority believe that they have a mandate from God and that the rulers in the 
Muslim world are anti-lslamic. They seek to topple governments, seize power, 
and impose their vision or interpretation of Islam upon society.
Islamic movements have been particularly strong among the younger 
generation, university graduates and young professionals, and the lower middle 
class. They recruit from mosques and universities, finding fertile ground among 
the politically and economically disenfranchised or oppressed. Contrary to 
popular expectations, their strength is not in the religious faculties and 
humanities so much as in science, engineering, education, law, and medicine. 
Organizations like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Jordan, and 
Sudan, Turkey's Refah (Welfare) Party (and now Virtue or Fazilet), Tunisia's 
Ennahda, South Asia's Jamaat-i-Islami, Malaysia's ABIM, or Indonesia's 
Muhammadiya consist in great part of university graduates and professionals. 
Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front, holds a doctorate 
in law from the Sorbonne. The senior leadership of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
includes judges, lawyers, and physicians. The Islamic Salvation Front's (FIS) 
Abbasi Madani earned a doctorate in education from a British university. 
Seventy-six percent of the FIS candidates in municipal and parliamentary 
elections held post-graduate degrees. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the now- 
suppressed Refah party, is a German trained engineer. Amien Rais, former 
leader of Indonesia’s Muhamaddiyya and now Speaker of parliament, like 




























































































holds a doctorate from the University of Chicago. Similar comments could be 
made about the leadership of many other Islamic organizations.
In general, most Islamic movements are urban-based, and draw heavily 
from lower middle and middle classes. A major portion of their leadership and 
membership are middle class professionals as well as the economically 
deprived. In the past, financial support has come from individuals within 
countries and from governments such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, and the Gulf 
states. In many Muslim countries and societies today, an alternative elite exists, 
modern educated but more self-consciously Islamically-oriented and committed 
to social and political activism as a means for creating a more Islamic society or 
system of government. This social phenomenon is reflected in civil society by 
the presence and often dominance of Islamists in professional syndicates or 
associations of lawyers, engineers, professors, and physicians. Where permitted 
to live and participate in society, they are found in every sector of society: 
government, the professions, and even the military. Thus, they provide an 
avowedly “Islamic alternative” to the power and privilege of more secular elites.
Democracy and Civil Society in the Muslim World
As in many other parts of the world, including the former Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Africa, the history of the modern Muslim world 
reveals a majority of authoritarian regimes. The Muslim experience has been 
one of kings, military, and ex-military rulers possessing tenuous legitimacy and 
propped up by their military and security forces. Indeed, the states of the Middle 
East are commonly referred to as security (mukhabarat) states. At best, many 
have been authoritarian states with democratic facades; parliamentary 
institutions and political parties that existed at the sufferance of rulers. At the 
same time, militant Islamic movements have often projected a religious 
authoritarianism and political intolerance of divergent viewpoints which 
parallels that of secular authoritarianism. Yet, in recent years, the call for greater 
liberalization and democratization has become common and widespread. 
Throughout much of the Muslim world diverse sectors of society, secular and 
religious, leftist and rightist, educated and uneducated increasingly use greater 
political participation or democratization as the litmus test by which to judge the 
legitimacy of governments and political movements alike.
Despite this reality, there are those who have increasingly charged that the 
absence of democracy is due to peculiar characteristics of Arab and Muslim 
culture. Some maintain that Arab culture and/or Islam are inherently 
authoritarian and thus incompatible with democracy. Others assert that the 




























































































product of the western experience that may well be inappropriate or non- 
transferable to other cultures.
The movement for democratization in the Muslim world has raised 
widespread discussion about the future of democracy in the Muslim world and 
the creation or promotion of civil society. Many Muslim countries, in common 
with other developing societies, face serious obstacles to the creation of strong 
civil societies: authoritarian governments whose legitimacy and stability are 
often dependent upon security forces, economic underdevelopment (chronic 
unemployment, lack of adequate housing), ethnic and regional strife (often a 
legacy of the artificial borders created by colonial powers), weak institutions and 
infrastructures.
The Quiet Revolution: Islam and Civil Society
The specter of “other Irans” or of extremist/terrorist groups were the dominant 
images of Muslim politics in the 1980s. However, in the late 1980s and 1990s 
the presence of a more nuanced, broader-based, diverse reality, became 
increasingly evident. Civic institutions such as associations of professional 
(journalists, physicians, engineers, university professors), human rights and 
women's organizations, political parties sprang up across the Muslim world. 
Beneath the radical monolithic facade, the world of small marginalized groups 
of extremists on the periphery of society, a quiet social and political revolution 
had taken place. While a militant rejectionist minority had sought to impose 
change from above through violent revolution or holy wars, many other Islamic 
activists actualized and institutionalized their faith through a bottom-up 
approach. They pursued a gradual transformation, Islamization or re- 
Islamization, of society through words and example, as well as social and 
political activism.
The comprehensive vision of Islamic renewal or reawakening from its 
early trailblazers, Hasan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood and Mawlana 
Mawdudi's Jamaat-I Islami, to contemporary movements is the desire to reassert 
Islam in cultural, social and economic life. As a result, Islamic activists and 
organizations have in fact trained in the professions, participated in professional 
associations, and created educational, financial, cultural and social institutions 
and associations. Thus, the majority of activists have not been trained in 
seminaries to be formal religious scholars (ulama) but are graduates of 
universities trained in the professions, from teaching, engineering and law to 
medicine, mass communications, and computer science.
In many Muslim countries, Islamic organizations and associations have 




























































































They have attracted members from the middle and lower middle classes 
(businessmen, bureaucrats, doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists) and revenue 
from non-governmental domestic sources as well as members working in the oil 
rich countries of the Gulf and Iraq. They have engaged in a broad range of social 
and political activities, from the creation of Islamic charitable associations 
(Jamiyyat Khayriyya) to participation in parliamentary and professional 
association elections. Their network of mosques, hospitals, clinics, day care 
centers, youth clubs, legal aid societies, foreign language schools, banks, drug 
rehabilitation programs, and publishing houses have multiplied. Islamic private 
volunteer organizations (PVOs) have filled a void and thus are, in some 
countries, an implicit critique of the government's ability to provide adequate 
services, in particular for the non-elite sectors of society. Their services provide 
an alternative to expensive private institutions or overcrowded public facilities. 
At the same time, they reinforce a sense of community identity as well as 
spiritual and moral renewal. Thus, for example, as will be discussed more 
extensively below, the educational and social programs of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Refah 
Party in Turkey were an integral part of their activities. They not only provided 
services but also mobilized popular support and loyalty which could be 
translated into votes. Militant resistance movements such as Lebanon's 
Hezbollah and HAMAS in Palestine strengthened their base of popular support 
and looked after the needs of their members and local citizens. Their combined 
political opposition and military action were augmented by substantial social 
services and charitable activities from education to housing and financial 
support for the families of members killed, wounded or detained by authorities.
It is essential to note that many, if not most, Islamic organizations and 
NGOs are non-political and non-violent. Thus, in the West Bank and Gaza, 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been the beneficiaries of services 
provided by Islamic social and economic institutions. Islamic associations 
provide support for between 7,000-10,000 orphans, spending between $3-4 
million annually for clothes, food, school supplies. Similar services are provided 
for approximately 5,000 families. Hundreds of Islamic medical clinics in Egypt, 
ranging from two to three-room clinics attached to a small mosque to major 
health care centers/hospitals such as the Mustapha Mahmud Islamic Clinic, are 
also supported by religiously motivated individuals and organizations. Their 
primary concern is responding to the needs of Egypt's poor and middle class.
The creation of Islamically oriented institutions and the participation of 
religiously motivated Muslims (political and apolitical) in professional 
associations, private voluntary organizations and corporate life have contributed 
to the gradual Islamization of society from below. A greater emphasis on 
Islamic discourse and symbolism as a source of legitimacy and authority is 































































































Islamizatioirjfrom below is not simply due to Islamist movements but also to the 
?> j activity of Muslim professionals (physicians, psychiatrists, professors, lawyers, 
c jourHalist^> social workers), many of whom are apolitical, but committed to a 
fr©Bfilktamically oriented community or society. Their support for religiously 
motivated projects (educational, medical, economic, social and religio-cultural) 
is informed by faith not politics.
Social activism has also been accompanied by increased political 
participation. In Iran, Mehdi Bazargan, the Paris-educated engineer and 
intellectual who would go on to be Iran's first prime minister after the fall of the 
shah and return of Ayatollah Khomeini, had emphasized the Islamic character of 
his Association of Engineers and his Liberation Movement in Iran. They joined 
with other professional associations such as the Association of Iranian 
Journalists and National Organization of Physicians as well as clerical leaders to 
challenge the shah. In Tunisia and Algeria, the Islamic Tendency Movement 
(later renamed Ennahda) and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) moved from an 
apolitical religio-cultural organizations to a sociopolitical movement whose 
projects for the poor and disenfranchised won supporters from the poor and 
unemployed. Their promise of a more credible and effective alternative attracted 
the votes of those who simply wanted to register a vote against the policies of 
the ruling party. For many of the disenfranchised in Turkey, the Refah (Welfare) 
Party's social programs in working class neighborhoods became reason enough 
to support the RP in municipal/local elections in 1994. Similarly, the 
effectiveness of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as a social and economic actor 
resulted in its emergence as a major social actor and opposition group in 
electoral politics. In the former Soviet Union, the Islamic Renaissance Party 
surfaced in the 1990s as a political opposition whose agenda included welfare 
services for the poor, private ownership of property, health programs and 
ecological projects.
Increased attention to social welfare has been incorporated into the 
redefinition or broadening of contemporary notions of dawah, religious 
propagation. The call (dawah) to Islam has increasingly become 
institutionalized, spawning modern organizations from Cairo to Kuala Lumpur. 
Moreover, many modern dawah organizations have not only called non-Muslims 
and Muslims to Islam but also become heavily involved in social welfare. ABIM 
in Malaysia, Diwan Dawat al-Islam in Indonesia, WAMY in Saudi Arabia and 
the Ansar al-Islam in Nigeria reflect the combination of preaching with 
education, medical, and other social services. These organizations are 
transnational as well as national: among the more active are the World Muslim 
League and the International Islamic Council Dawah and Relief which has 




























































































' Political Participation and Civil Society
I Throughout the 1980s media images of radical Islamic fundamentalism had been accompanied by charges by many governments in the Muslim world that Islamic movements were simply violent revolutionaries, unrepresentative extremist 
organizations whose lack of popular support would be evident if elections were 
held. However, few governments proved willing to test that claim. When 
political systems were opened up and Islamic organizations were able to 
participate in elections, the results stunned many in the Muslim world and the 
West.
;
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, failed economies and mass 
demonstrations moved governments (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan) to hold 
elections. Islamic activists ran as candidates (Egypt and Tunisia refused to grant 
legal recognition as political parties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda 
respectively) and in some cases as political parties (Jordan and Algeria). In the 
post-Gulf war Kuwait and Yemen held elections and King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia, after hesitant moves to create an appointed consultative council (majlis 
al-shura) to the king, continued to encounter demands for greater participation 
and government accountability. The electoral track record of Islamic 
organizations and the diverse responses of governments to the emergence of 
Islamists as significant actors in civil society and in Muslim politics may be 
witnessed in a brief survey of Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Iran and the 
Gulf.
Tunisia
After seizing power from Bourghiba in 1987, Zein Abidine Ben Ali promised 
democratization and held parliamentary elections in April 1989. In early 1989, 
MTI had renamed itself Hizb al-Nahda (The Renaissance Party) in order to 
comply with Ben Ali's stated position that no single group should monopolize 
the claim to be Islamic since all Tunisians were Muslim. As one of its leaders 
had earlier declared, “[we] accepted the rules of the game ... we want to act 
within the framework of democracy.” Yet, in spite of this, the government did 
not permit it to participate as a legal political party. High inflation, growing 
unemployment, and increased poverty proved to be consequential: Islamic 
candidates won 14.5% of the vote nationwide and a stunning 30% in cities like 
Tunis, Gabes, and Sousse.
The Renaissance Party's early commitment to pluralist politics reflected 
the thinking of its leaders, in particular Rashid al-Ghannoushi. Al-Nahda's 
leaders combined the criteria of Islam with that of democracy to critique the 




























































































support. For Ghannoushi, democracy, popular sovereignty and the role of the 
state multiparty elections, and constitutional law are all part of a “new Islamic 
thinking” whose roots and legitimacy are found in a fresh interpretation or 
reinterpretation of Islamic sources. He distinguished between God's sovereignty 
over the universe and the creation of the state, arguing that “The state is not 
something from God but from the people...the state has to serve the benefit of 
the Muslims.”
Ghannoushi indicated his willingness to work within the legal framework 
to improve it by making it more democratic and pluralistic. He maintained that 
the parliamentary system was the legitimate means for universal participation in 
the political process through elections, one that fulfills the role of the Islamic 
institution of a consultative council (majlis al-shura). Indeed he declared: 
“Islam, which enjoins the recourse to Shura (consultation) as a principle 
governing relations between political authority and the people, finds in 
democracy the appropriate instruments (elections, parliamentary system, 
separation of powers, etc.) to implement the Shura.” Ghannoushi maintained 
that the Quranic prescription or principle that there is no compulsion in religion 
a sure basis for religious, cultural, political and ideological pluralism in Muslim 
society.
In contrast to many other Islamic activists, Ghannoushi has maintained 
that if the Tunisian people voted Nahda out of power in favor of even a 
communist or atheist government, then as good Muslims the party would have 
to accept the verdict of the people. He has called upon the West to apply a 
similar standard of respect for the people's choice, chiding the West for not 
promoting its democratic ideals in the Muslim world: “While the West criticizes 
Islamic governments for not being democratic, it also supports governments 
who are not democratic and are keeping Islamic movements from developing 
their ideas.
Algeria
Algeria like Jordan allowed Islamists to participate in electoral politics as 
political parties not just as indovidual candidates. While the performance of 
Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists in winning 32 of 80 seats 
proved an unexpected surprise, the stunning electoral successes of Algeria's 
Islamic Salvation Front proved a decisive turning point.
Algeria had been dominated by a one party dictatorship, the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), for decades. Socialist and with a strong secular elite and 
feminist movement, few took Algeria's Islamic movement seriously. The 




























































































difficulties among them a 25% unemployment level, foreign debt of some $20 
billion, and food shortages. Following bloody anti-government riots of October 
1988, the government felt constrained to hold elections. Algeria, long regarded 
as one of the most monolithic, single-party political systems in the Arab world, 
held multi-party elections which included the Islamic Salvation Front (Front 
Islamique du Salut, FIS), North Africa's first legal Islamic political party, led by 
Shaykh Ali Abbasi al-Madani. Islamic groups had flourished as Algerian state 
socialism failed to resolve its social and economic problems. The FIS, with a 
national organization and an effective mosque and social welfare network, 
emerged as the largest of these groups and one of the strongest opposition 
parties. In the June 1990 municipal elections, the first multi-party election since 
independence in 1962, the FIS scored a stunning victory, capturing 54% of the 
vote, while the National Liberation Front (FLN) garnered 34%. The victory of 
the Islamic Salvation Front in municipal elections in 1990 sent a shock wave 
throughout the world. In the aftermath of elections, the government arrested FIS 
leaders, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, the cut off funds from the central 
government to municipalities which often crippled FIS officials' ability to 
provide services, and gerrymandered to redraw voting districts more favorably. 
Despite these precautions, the FLN failed to prevent the FIS from an even more 
stunning electoral sweep of parliamentary elections. Amidst the euphoria and 
celebration of Islamists within Algeria and across the Muslim world, the 
Algerian military intervened, forced the resignation of Algeria’s president, 
arrested FIS leaders, imprisoned more that 10,000 in desert camps/prisons, 
outlawed the FIS and seized its assets.
In the face of this repression much of the world stood silent. The 
conventional wisdom had been blind-sided. While most feared and were on their 
guard against “other Irans,” the FIS victory in Algeria raised the specter of an 
Islamic movement coming to power not through violent revolution but through 
democratic elections. Ballots not bullets proved to be even more worrisome for 
many world leaders. The justification for acceptance of the Algerian military's 
seizure of power was the charge that the FIS merely wished to “hijack 
democracy;” that they really only believed in “One man, one vote, one time.” 
The threat of violent revolutionary Islam was intensified by fear of the capture 
of power from within the political system.
Turkey
The seemingly inexplicable power of Islamists at the ballot box was reinforced 
in secular Turkey, long regarded as a paragon of Muslim secularism, the most 
secular of Muslim states. The Refah (Welfare) Party won mayoral elections in 
1994 in more than a dozen major cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. Refah 




























































































network, businesses, professional associations, and the media. As Turkish senior 
politicians squabbled and the West looked on, Refah, after winning 158 seats in 
the 550 National Assembly in parliamentary elections in December 1995, came 
to power at the head of a coalition government. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan become 
Turkey's first Islamist prime minister in its 45 year history.
Welfare used democracy as a yardstick by which to judge the failures of 
Turkish secularism to be truly pluralistic, to respect the rights of all of its 
citizens, including their freedom of conscience or right to live according to their 
religious beliefs. Erbakan had maintained that true secularism (separation of 
religion from the state) should not only mean state autonomy but religious 
autonomy. That is, religion also has its autonomy which should respected by and 
free from state interference. The stats should not intervene in the religious 
sphere by attempting to regulate dress (the right of women to wear a headscarf 
or, for that matter, men to wear beards) or religious practice. The WP wished to 
add a new amendment regarding the definition of secularism to guarantee the 
right of all people to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. For Turkey's 
radical secularists, this stance was regarded as a direct threat: “The radical 
secularists, comprising the majority of the intelligentsia, including a number of 
leading journalists, believe this stand on the part of RP is a challenge to the 
secular premises of the state. They think that the RP is concealing its long-term 
intention to establish an Islamic state in Turkey.”
The successes of the WP were due to many factors: the failures of 
previous governments meant that Welfare garnered the support of its members 
and of a crossover protest vote from disgruntled voters who would normally 
support other parties. The vote was as much, if not more, about politics and 
economics (double and triple-digit inflation, urban poverty, inadequate social 
services and health care, pollution, congestion, high employment, inadequate 
housing, crime, corruption) as about religion. Indeed, a 1994 survey found that 
only one-third of the WP's voters voted primarily because it was an Islamic 
party. Welfare’s focus on voter issues like employment, pensions, health care, 
housing, and environment and its indictment of the failures of society reflected 
in the WP's slogans of “clean politics” and a “just order,” proved effective. The 
reason for the successes of Welfare mayors in many municipalities such as 
Istanbul and Ankara was widely acknowledged: “Refah Party mayors have 
offered better services than their predecessors and worked hard to improve 
public services. They have reduced corruption and nepotism in the 
municipalities and acted more professionally than other parties of the left and 
right.” The combined track records of many Welfare municipal governments 
and of the WP workers in neighborhoods brought effective social change and 
made for a formidable force in electoral politics. At the same time, its support 




























































































businessmen who resented the state's continued ownership of as much as 60% of 
the financial and manufacturing sector, its failure to curb the powers of big 
industrialists, and its dependence on European imports. Thus, Welfare enjoyed 
the support of MUSIAD, a Muslim business association founded in 1990 which 
advocates full liberalization and privatization of the economy.
During Erbakan's brief tenure as prime minister, Welfare encouraged the 
expanded role of religion in society: increasing the number of schools, religious 
foundations, businesses, banks, social services, and the media. Both secular 
Muslims and religious minorities such as Turkey's Alevi Muslim minority 
(perhaps 20% of its 98% Muslim population), despite the public assurances of 
Welfare, were skeptical about the WP's commitment to pluralism. They 
questioned whether the WP’s redefinition of the state would affect its ability to 
respect the rights of others -  other (non-Welfare) Muslims, non-believers and 
religious minorities. Cynics charged that the WP, like the FIS in Algeria, was 
using the democratic system to come to power in order to dismantle Turkey's 
democratic and secular state.
Erbakan's biggest obstacle proved predictably to be the military. Turkey’s 
military has a long history of influence and intervention in domestic politics. 
Staunch secularists, some might say militant secularists, with a low opinion of 
Turkey's politicians, they have consistently espoused the role of defenders of 
Kemalism and have had an allergic reaction to any form of religion in public 
life, from female students right to wear a headscarf (hejab) to Islamist politics. 
Among the common justifications for previous coups was the claim that the 
government had betrayed Ataturk s principle of secularism. Thus, it took every 
occasion to signal its concerns about any compromising of Turkey's secular 
principles. They instituted a new purge of officers who were suspected of being 
Islamists. (Grounds could be the fact that an officer's wife wore a headscarf or 
that they prayed at a mosque). In Spring 1997, it presented the Erbakan 
government with a set of 18 demands, designed to stem an Islamist threat to the 
secular state. These included restrictions on the wearing of Islamic dress, 
measures to prevent Islamists from entering the military or government 
administration, and a mandate that the Imam-Hatep schools, religious schools, 
that it believed taught religious propaganda and served as a training ground for 
Islamists, be closed because of their anti-secular bias. At the same time, the 
military demanded that compulsory secular education be increased from five to 
eight years. In April, General Cevik Bir publicly declared that the military's top 
priority, greater than that of its 10 year battle with Kurdish separatism, was the 
struggle against anti-secular Islamists. Erbakan and the Welfare Party's brief 
government proved to be a lightening rod for militant secularists, contributing to 
the increased polarization of society. Turkey's radical secularists' (much of the 




























































































belief in the separation of religion and the state but on an anti-religious secular 
ideology/belief system, which was as rigid, militant and intolerant as it claimed 
“Islamic fundamentalism” was. The fear and charges of radical secularists led 
some to observe: “There is a neurotic edge to the way many secularists talk 
about the awkward, rather earnest, just-up-from-the-country sort of people who 
make up most of Mr. Erbakan's following.” As in Algeria, the secularist 
establishment was willing to compromise Turkey's commitment to democracy to 
prevent Islamists from participating in politics and society and to preserve their 
power, privilege, and lifestyle rather than allow voters to choose through free 
and open elections. It was unwilling to take the risk that democracy always 
involves, one that some leading Turkish secularists had believed possible, if not 
necessary, if democracy was to prevail: “A marriage between Islam and 
democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying 
to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists, and if 
the latter do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the 
secular democratic state in Turkey. A critical mediating role can be played by 
moderate secularists whose numbers are on the increase.” Ayse Kadiogl 
commented, the Republican elite, the political offspring/disciples of Ataturk, 
were moved by a “disgust” towards religion even if they sometimes resorted to 
religious symbols, paying lip service to religion. Sherif Mardin's comparison of 
this Kemalist attitude to Voltaire's hatred of the Church goes a long way toward 
understanding the source and living legacy of militant secularism in Turkey.
The military increased the intensity of its campaign in June by conducting 
briefings forjudges, attorneys and the media on the Islamist threat to the Turkish 
state. Finally, the Erbakan-Ciller coalition collapsed. Erbakan submitted his 
resignation on June 18, 1997. In February 28 (or 22?), 1998, Turkey's 
Constitutional Court issued a court order which banned Welfare. Erbakan was 
expelled from Parliament and barred from participation in the political process 
for five years. Welfare's assets were seized. He and a number of other leaders 
were tried for sedition. In February 1998 a new law was passed requiring that 
children first complete 8 years of secular education program before being 
permitted to take Quran classes. Weekend and summer Quran courses were 
banned. Female students and teachers in Islamic schools were barred from 
wearing the hejab, a ban that already existed in all other areas of education and 
in government departments.
Egypt
In Egypt, the breathing space of the early Mubarak years had enabled Islamic 
political and social activism to grow more rapidly, to expand its institutions, and 
to become part of mainstream society. Perhaps the most significant development 




























































































(philanthropic) Islamic organizations became effective agents of social and 
political change, developing alternative socioeconomic institutions and 
participating in the political process, demonstrating their strength in institution 
building and popular mobilization.
The Muslim Brothers and other Islamic activists became dominant voices 
in professional associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists. 
Professional syndicates, democratic and voluntary associations of teachers, 
lawyers, physicians, engineers, and journalists, which have been pillars of 
Egyptian civil society. As Raymond Baker has observed regarding the Muslim 
Brotherhood: “Denied access to the political arena, they have made the 
professional syndicates perhaps the most vibrant institutions of Egyptian civil 
society.”
By the 1990s, the mainstreaming of Islamic activism had produced a 
professional class whose impact included election to leadership positions in 
professional associations or syndicates. In September 1992, the Brotherhood's 
winning of a majority of the board seats in Bar Association elections, long 
regarded as a bastion of liberalism, signaled this strength and influence. Muslim 
Brotherhood successes reflected the growing number of younger Islamist- 
oriented professionals, the appeal of the Brotherhood to professional classes as 
the only credible opposition, the indifference of many professionals about voting 
in association elections, and the ability of a well organized, highly motivated 
minority to “get out the vote” and work with purpose and persistence.
The clearest testimony to the mainstreaming and institutionalization of 
Islamic revivalism or activism was the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as 
a political force in electoral politics. Operating within the political system, 
moderate activists such as the Muslim Brotherhood couched their criticisms and 
demands within the context of a call for greater democratization, political 
representation, social justice and respect for human rights. At the same time, the 
Mabarak government continued to be a “presidential state.” Mubarak won 
presidential elections with 94% of the vote in an election marred by voting 
irregularities and with no opposition candidate. The People's Assembly and the 
bureaucracy continued to be dominated by the Government's National 
Democratic Party. The government maintained absolute control over the 
creation and continued existence of political parties; thus, it refused legal 
recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political party.
Radical violent alternatives, more silent in the early Mabarak period, 
boldly and directly challenged the regime and Egyptian society in the late 1980s 
and 1990s. Islamists in Assyut, Minya, Cairo, and Alexandria pressed for an 




























































































overthrowing the government, extremists attacked and murdered foreign 
tourists, Coptic Christians, and government officials as well as bombed banks 
and government buildings. Mubarak's flexible policy of the late 1980s gave way 
to more aggressive response to the challenge of both religious extremists (those 
who advocate the violent overthrow of the government) and moderates (those 
who participate within the established political and legal framework). In the 
process the lines between radical and moderate Islamists, state security and the 
limits of state authority, prosecution of criminals and human rights have often 
been blurred. The government broadened its battle beyond the Gamaa 
Islamiyya, Jihad, and other radical groups, using harassment and imprisonment 
to also curb the growing strength and challenge of more moderate Islamist 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. It attempted not only to eradicate 
violent extremism but also increasingly to counter and control the legal 
institutionalization of Islamic activism politically and socially (professional 
associations, schools and mosques) in Egyptian society. Its war against 
“terrorism” led to a broad government crackdown and massive arrests not only 
of suspected extremists but also of moderate Islamists in an attempt to silence all 
Islamic opposition. Thousands were held without charge; the Arab Human 
Rights Organization accused the government of routine torture. The Mubarak 
government's extended war not just against the terrorism of the Gamaa Islamiya 
but against Egypt's strongest legal opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
One prominent commentator observed that the government sought: “to curtail 
not only those movements that have carried out violent attacks, but also one that 
has come to dominate many municipalities, professional and labor associations 
and university faculties.”
The government crusade included legislation in February 1993 to counter 
the prominence of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, in democratic 
and voluntary associations of teachers, lawyers, physicians, engineers, and 
journalists. In a move widely seen as an attempt to weaken the influence of 
Islamists, the government-controlled People's Assembly passed a new 
educational law. Law 104, on May 31, without warning or consultation, which 
cancelled the right of Egyptian professors to elect their faculty deans and allows 
the rectors of universities to appoint them instead. Opponents charged that 
despite the fact that the Brotherhood had not been particularly active or 
successful in university faculties, the law is “one step in the government's 
attempt to eliminate any possibility of the Islamists capturing any more key 
positions...[and that] If university professors are not to be trusted with electing 
their own representative, then there is no point in talking about democracy.”
The government also moved to control a breeding ground for Islamic 
opposition, Egypt's private mosques. The vast majority of Egypt's mosques were 




























































































and activities) rather than state-controlled. However, the overwhelming majority 
were private mosques outside government control. Although both Sadat and 
later Mubarak (in 1985) announced plans to take control of private mosques, 
given the enormous number of mosques and limited resources, results had been 
limited. In October 1992, Mubarak's ministry of religious affairs announced that 
all sermons at state-controlled mosques would be subject to approval by 
government appointed officials and that the building of private mosques would 
be curbed. On November 10, 1992, Mohammed Ali Mahgoub, the minister of 
religious affairs, announced that all private mosques would be brought under the 
control of the ministry.
The degree and extent of the Mubarak government's concerns about 
schools and universities as primary sources of Islamic militancy were reflected 
in a statement by Hussein Kamel Baha Eddin, Minister of Education: “Terrorism 
starts in the mind... The fundamentalists are planning to brainwash our children 
to seize power.” The government designated education as an issue of national 
security and initiated a number of policies designed to counter its “Islamist 
threat.” Teachers suspected of being Islamists or having Islamist sympathies 
were dismissed, retired, or transferred -  many to clerical positions in remote 
areas. A national curriculum was imposed; and, in a reversal of previous policy, 
an attempt was made to introduce English and Western secular values to provide 
a window on development as well as “a 'culture shock' to upset the wave of 
fundamentalism sweeping Egypt's schools.”
Iran the Gulf
Iran and the Gulf provide their own distinctive experiences. Post revolutionary 
Iran saw the suppression of political and religious dissent by militant clergy, 
from royalists to the Tudeh party, from secularist opposition to a variety of 
religiously oriented officials and leaders senior ayatollahs like Mehdi Bazargan, 
the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister and Ayatollah Shariatmadari. 
However, despite restrictions parliamentary elections and heated parliamentary 
debate continued undisturbed and gradually during Hashmi Rafsanjani's 
presidency increased liberalization occurred amidst a struggle between more 
progressive/pragmatic forces (led by Rafsanjani) and militant ideologues (led by 
Khomeini's successor Ayatollah Khamenei).
The election of Mohammed Khatami as president by more than 70% of 
the population signaled the third phase of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Khomeini, Rafsanjani/Khamenei, and Khatami). Significant voter support came 
from women and younger people among others who desired a more open 
society. President Khatami has signaled his responsiveness by emphasizing two 




























































































democratization, the rule of law, increased women's rights and respect for 
human rights. The latter refers to attempts to reestablish or strengthen cultural 
and in time political relations with the United States and Europe.
Though final authority remains in the hands of Ayatollah Khamenei, often 
referred to as the “Supreme Leader,” Khatami and his Minister of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, Aetollah Mohajerani, institutionalized these issues through 
official statements, in speeches and in national conferences such as the 
conference on Islam and Civil Society in January 1998. In several prominent 
cases involving attempts by more militant factions to silence critics like 
Ayatollah Montazeri, once designated as Khomeini's heir, and Ibrahim Yazdi, a 
former foreign minister during the early days of the Islamic Republic and leader 
of the Bazargan-founded Freedom Party, Khatami quietly pressed issues of civil 
society, particularly rule of law, to foster their release. While Iranians have 
experienced greater freedoms and “space,” more militant factions in the 
government have fought back arresting, trying and imprisoning Khatami 
supporters like the former Mayor of Teheran and the Interior Minister. They 
have closed newspapers, encouraged confrontations on university campuses, 
refused to approve the credentials of potential electoral candidates.
The situation in much of the Gulf has been quite different. In most 
countries, political and social organization and participation in society remain 
controlled by the state/ruling families. There is little non-state approved 
space/activity. In recent years, Saudi Arabia and Oman have created a majlis or 
consultative assembly, appointed by the ruler. Bahrain has resisted calls for a 
reopening of parliament and harshly suppressed voices of dissent. Only Kuwait 
and Yemen have held parliamentary elections. Few Gulf countries permit 
political parties, unions, professional associations, or a free press.
Government Responses to Civil Society in the Post-Gulf War Period
The record of Islamic republics in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan reinforced for 
some old images and fears of the spread of religious authoritarianism. Muslim 
rulers pondered the challenge of the growing power of Islamism in the 
institutions of mainstream society and Europe faced the specter of an Islamist 
led state in its midst in Turkey. Democratization became a major issue in 
Muslim politics. It led not only to political debate but also to a military takeover 
and a virtual civil war in Algeria, the suppression of Islamists in Tunisia and 
Egypt, and a military/secular confrontation with Turkey's first Islamist prime 
minister which drove him out of office and the subsequent banning of the Refah 
Party. In its most extreme forms, the struggle sometimes appeared to be a battle 




























































































curtailed political participation and strictly limited, if not suppressed, the 
development of the culture and institutions of civil society.
Threat or Challenge to Civil Society?
In contrast to other parts of the world, increased calls for greater political 
participation and democratization in the Middle East in the late 1990s were met 
by empty rhetoric or repression by many rulers and by strong ambivalence or 
silence in the West. The threat of “Islamic fundamentalism” increased 
authoritarianism and suppression of Islamic parties or groups in Tunisia, 
Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Turkey. Western governments and 
policymakers often stood by ambivalent, if not compliant.
Fear of fundamentalism, like responses to the communist threat, made 
strange bedfellows, providing a ready excuse for repression and the violation of 
human rights. Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan (under Benazir 
Bhutto) as well as Israel warned of a regional and international Islamic threat in 
a bid to cunry western aid or excuse their repression of Islamists. Moreover, as 
one observer noted “Israel which for years won American and European backing 
as a bulwark against the spread of communism throughout the Middle East, is 
now projecting itself as the West's defense against militant Islam, a movement it 
is portraying as an even greater danger.” Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin justified 
the expulsion of 415 Palestinians:
Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to awaken the 
world, which is lying in slumber....We call on all nations, all peoples to devote 
their attention to the greater danger inherent in Islamic fundamentalism...This is 
a real and serious danger that threatens world peace in future years...we stand on 
the line of fire against the danger of fundamentalist Islam.
Equating Khomeiniism with a pan-Islamic threat and drawing parallels 
with communism, Shimon Peres declared, “Since the collapse of communism in 
the Soviet Union, we consider Khomeiniism the greatest danger the Middle East 
is facing — not only us but the Arabs as well...it has many of the characteristics 
of communism. It is fanatic, it is ideological ... Most of all, it has the same 
inclination to export its ideas.”
Israel and its Arab neighbors warned that a resurgent Iran exported 
revolution throughout much of the Muslim world, Sudan, the West Bank and 
Gaza, Algeria, Central Asia as well as Europe and America. Indeed Egypt's 
Hosni Mubarak called for a “global alliance” against this menace. Many 




























































































arrests of Muslim fundamentalists for conspiracy to set off other bombs as 
further proof of the international and anti-western nature of the threat.
A Triple Threat?
Islam is often portrayed as a triple threat: political, civilizational, and 
demographic. Fear of Iran's export of the revolution in the 1980s was succeeded 
by fears of a monolithic, international pan-Islamic movement at the heart of 
which is an Iranian-Sudanese axis: “The fear is of the militant brand of Islam 
being espoused by Iran, practiced in Sudan and spread by organizations like the 
Muslim Brotherhood in and from countries that have turned a blind eye to their 
activities.” In the 1990s, despite Iran's relative failure in exporting revolution, 
talk of a global Islamic threat increased, combining fear of violent revolution 
with that of Algerian-style electoral victories. France's Raymond Aron’s warning 
in the 1980s of an Islamic revolutionary wave generated by the fanaticism of the 
prophet and Cyrus Vance’s concern about an “Islamic-Western war were 
succeeded by Charles Krauthammer's assertion of a global Islamic threat of 
“fundamentalist Koran-waving Khomeniism,” led by the new commintern, Iran.
The Ayatollah Khomeini's condemnation to death of Salman Rushdie 
combined with Saddam Hussein's call for an Islamic holy war against the West 
during the Gulf War reinforced fears of a political and cultural confrontation. 
This was magnified by some who reduced contemporary realities to the playing 
out of ancient rivalries, political confrontations rooted in a clash of civilizations.
It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far 
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue 
them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -  perhaps irrational but surely 
historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.
Muslim-Western relations and conflicts have been placed within the 
context of an historical confrontation in which Islam is again pitted against the 
West, against “our Judeo-Christian and secular West,” rather than specific 
political and socioeconomic grievances. Thus, what can the West really do to 
respond to what is obviously primarily emotional and “irrational,” an assault 
upon the West by peoples who are peculiarly driven by their passions and 
hatred? As James Piscatori, in explaining this phenomenon, observed:
Whether it was the Ottoman attempt to thwart Christian nationalists or the 
Muslim attempt to gain independence from the West, Islam was fanatical 
because it ran counter to imperial interests. But it was the converse formulation 




























































































the West because it was fanatical...Consequently, Muslims came to be seen as a 
uniformly emotional and sometimes illogical race that moved as one body and 
spoke with one voice.
The growth of Muslim populations in Europe and America has resulted in 
Islam becoming the second largest religion in Germany and France and the third 
largest in Britain and America. Disputes over Muslim minority rights, 
demonstrations and clashes during the Salman Rushdie affair, the World Trade 
Center and conviction of Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman and others of plotting to 
blow up major sites in America as well as bombings in Paris by Algeria's Armed 
Islamic Guard have been exploited by strident voices of the right — politicians 
like France's LePen, neo-Nazi youth in Germany, and right-wing political 
commentators in the United States. One European expert warned:
While Europe has overcome the cold war ... it now risks creating new 
divisions and conflicts, such as a white, wealthy and Christian “Fortress Europe” 
pitted against a largely poor, Islamic world. That could lead to terrorism and 
another forty years of small, hot wars...
The Diversity of Muslim Politics
The realities of Muslim politics and societies refute images of a monolithic, pan- 
Islamic threat. Despite a common “Islamic” orientation, governments reveal 
little unity of purpose in interstate and international relations due to conflicting 
national interests or priorities. Qaddafi was a bitter enemy of Anwar Sadat and 
Jafar al- Numayri at the very time that all were projecting their “Islamic 
images”. Today he remains at odds with Sudan's Hasan Turabi, portoayed in the 
press as the “Ayatollah of Africa,” as well as with Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. 
Khomeini's Islamic Republic consistently called for the overthrow of the House 
of Saud and other Gulf states on Islamic grounds. In 1998, it reversed its policy 
and moved to mend its fences with Saudi Arabia while at the same time 
denouncing the excesses of the most recently declared Islamic government of 
the Taleban in Afghanistan.
Islamically identified governments also reflect differing relationships with 
the West. Libya and Iran's relationship with the West, and the United States in 
particular, has often been confrontational. At the same time, the U.S. has had 
strong allies in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bahrain. National 
interest and regional politics rather than ideology or religion remain the major 




























































































Civil Society, Democratization, and Foreign Policy
As we have seen, in recent years Islam has reemerged as a significant political 
and social force in civil society. Islamic candidates have been elected prime 
ministers and speakers of parliaments, cabinet ministers, and parliamentarians in 
Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Lebanon. The performance of Islamist groups in national and municipal 
elections since the late 1980s has defied those who had insisted that Islamic 
movements were unrepresentative and would not attract voters. The FIS sweep 
of Algerian elections and the likelihood that they would come to power through 
the ballot box as did the subsequent election of Necmettin Erbakan of the Refah 
(Welfare) Party as Prime Minister of Turkey exacerbated the fears of many 
rulers in the Muslim and in the West. The Algerian military's intervention and 
repression of FIS, the Turkish military's role in forcing the resignation of the 
Erbakan government and the subsequent banning of the Refah Party, North 
African and Egyptian governments' indiscriminate crackdown on their Islamic 
movements, as well as Western governments' concerns have been justified by 
the charge that Islamists were out to “hijack democracy.”
Ironically, participation within the system and relative success made 
movements more, rather than less, of a threat in the eyes of some. For leaders in 
the West, democracy raises the prospect of old and reliable friends or client 
states being transformed into more independent and less predictable nations. 
This prospect generated a fear that Islamic governments would undermine 
stability in the Middle East and broader Muslim world, make Western access to 
oil less secure, and threaten the security of Israel. Lack of enthusiasm or support 
for political liberalization in the Middle East and broader Muslim world has 
been rationalized by the claim that both Arab culture and Islam are inherently 
anti-democratic (an issue never raised to a comparable degree with regard to the 
former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or Africa). The proof offered is the lack 
of a democratic tradition, more specifically, the paucity of democracies in the 
Muslim world. Why the glaring absence of democratic governments? The 
political realities of the Muslim world have not been conducive to the 
development of democratic traditions and institutions. European colonial rule 
and post-independence national governments headed by military and ex-military 
rulers or monarchs have contributed to a legacy which has had little concern for 
political participation and the building of strong democratic institutions. 
National unity and stability as well as political legitimacy have been undermined 
by the artificial nature of modern states whose national boundaries were often 
determined or drawn by colonial powers and whose rulers were either placed on 
their thrones by Europe or simply seized power for themselves. Weak 




























































































generation, exacerbate the situation, undermining confidence in governments 
and increasing the appeal of “Islamic fundamentalism.”
Experts and policymakers who question whether Islamic movements will 
use electoral politics to “hijack democracy” (“One man, one vote, one time) 
often fail to show equal concern that few rulers in the region have been 
democratically elected and that many who speak of democracy only believe in 
“risk free democracy.” They permit political participation and liberalization as 
long there is no risk of a strong opposition (secular or religious) or a potential 
loss of power. Failure to appreciate that the issue of the hijacking of democracy 
is a two way street was reflected in the responses (an awkward silence or 
support) of many western governments and experts for the Algerian military's 
intervention and cancellation of the results of the democratic electoral process 
and the Turkish military's suppression of the Refah party.
Perception of a global “Islamic threat” contributes to support for, silence, 
or “strategic” acceptance by Western governments of repression of Islamists and 
their institutions by governments in the Middle East and the broader Muslim 
world and thus to the creation of a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” The thwarting of a 
participatory political process by governments that cancel elections or repress 
populist Islamic movements fosters radicalization and extremism. Many 
Islamists who experience regime violence (harassment, imprisonment, torture) 
conclude that seeking “democracy” is a dead end, become convinced that force 
or violence is their only recourse against repressive regimes. Official silence or 
economic and political support for regimes is read as complicity and a sign of 
the West's “double standard” for the implementation of democracy. Regime 
repression and violation of human rights and a compliant U.S. or western policy 
towards such actions creates conditions that lead to political violence. It 
seemingly validates prior contention and prophecy that Islamic movements are 
inherently violent, anti-democratic and a threat to national and regional stability. 
More constructive and democratic strategies are possible. The strength of 
Islamic organizations and parties is as much due to their constituting the only 
viable voice and vehicle for opposition in relatively closed political systems. 
The electoral strength of Tunisia's Renaissance Party, Algeria's FIS, Jordan's 
Muslim Brotherhood, or Turkey's Refah party has come not only from a hard 
core of dedicated followers but also from the fact that they were the most 
credible and effective alternative “game in town.” Thus, their electoral support 
included both those who voted for their Islamic agenda as well as those who 
simply wished to vote against the government. Opening up the political system 
and strengthening the institutions of civil society fosters the growth and strength 
of competing opposition parties, alternative choices, and thus weakens Islamic 




























































































of civil society is a hedge against the perpetuation of a culture of 
authoritarianism, secular or religious.
Finally, the realities of a more open marketplace, having to compete for 
votes or coming to power and having to rule amidst diverse interests can force 
Islamic organizations (as they often do secular political parties) to adapt or 
broaden their ideology and programs in response to domestic realities, diverse 
constituencies and interests. The history of many contemporary movements 
reflects this reality. Mawlana Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i Islami, was an 
early critic of both nationalism and democracy. Subsequently, the Jamaat as also 
the Muslim Brotherhood came to accept and “Islamize” democracy, 
participating in elections and using it as a yardstick to critique incumbent 
governments. Islamic movements like Tunisia's Ennahda, Turkey's Refah Party, 
Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia 
have also followed suit, changing and evolving ideologically. These changes 
have not always resulted in similar outcomes as witnessed by the divergent 
views of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda as compared to the Jamaat-i 
Islami regarding the role of women in public life. All are challenged to 
recognize that democratization and the building of strong civil societies in the 
Muslim world are part of a process of experimentation, necessarily accompanied 
by failure as well as success. The transformation of the West from feudal 
monarchies to democratic nation states took time, trial and error. It was 
accompanied by political as well as intellectual revolutions that rocked both 
state and church. It was a long, drawn-out process, among contending voices 
and factions with competing visions and interests.
Islam and Pluralism
A critical issue in Muslim politics today is that of pluralism. Historically, the 
monotheistic visions of both Islam and Christianity and the belief of each that it 
possessed the final and complete revelation of God and was charged to call all to 
salvation resulted in competing claims and missions and produced theological 
and political conflict. In the 19th and 20th centuries, much of mainstream 
Christianity grappled with and came to grips with the realities of pluralism in the 
modem world. The outcome was the result of a process of reform in which 
doctrines were reexamined and reinterpreted. For example, Roman Catholicism 
in the late 19th and first half of the 20th century resisted and condemned much 
of what was termed “modernism” (from popular sovereignty and elections to 
pluralism). However, in the late 1960s at Vatican II, the church for the first time 
officially recognized and accepted pluralism.
For Muslims today the issue of pluralism is directly related to the status of 




























































































Muslim minority communities living under non-Muslim rule or non-Muslim 
governments. While historically Islam often proved more flexible in tolerating 
non-Muslim (People of the Book) as minorities whose protected (dhimmi) status 
enabled them to live and practice their faith under Muslim rule, that status 
amounts to second class citizenship in the modern world. In addition, the 
persecution and suppression of non-Muslims by some Muslim governments and 
by some Islamic movements underscores the need for reinterpretation (ijtihad) 
and reform (islah) if the rights of all citizens are to be guaranteed.
Today, due to an unprecedented number of Muslim immigrants and 
refugees, there are more Muslim minority communities in existence across the 
globe than at any previous time in history. While some Muslims wish some day 
to return, most face living in new non-Muslim homelands permanently. This 
reality raises many questions of citizenship: from loyalty and political 
participation to living in societies whose laws are not based upon Islamic law. 
Thus, for Muslims today and for Muslim reformers, pluralism is a critical 
concern both for Muslim majority countries and for Muslim minority 
communities. From Egypt to Indonesia, scholars debate and reinterpret Islamic 
doctrines and laws. As with other faiths, the lines of the debate are often drawn 
between traditionalists, who wish to simply follow the authority of the past and 
modernists or reformers who argue the need and acceptability of a fresh 
interpretation of Islamic sources, a reformulation of Islam.
Related to a re-examination of the concept of pluralism is that of 
tolerance. Historically, religious tolerance has tended to be simply equated with 
non-persecution of others, allowing or suffering their existence. However, the 
realities of contemporary life in a global society require that tolerance be based 
more genuinely on mutual understanding and respect, the ability to agree to 
disagree. Reflecting on the true meaning and basis of tolerance, Singapore' 
Association of Muslim Professionals noted: “We need to emphasize that 
endeavours which merely promote “tolerance” of cultural differences or merely 
impart disjointed “quaint facts” about another ethnic group contribute little to - 
and perhaps in fact undermine - the achievement of multi-culturalism or inter- 
cultural understanding.” One need not deny essential religious, ideological or 
political differences of be able to function as neighbors domestically and 
internationally. Differences of opinion and opposition need not be perceived as a 
threat.
A diverse group of Muslim intellectuals and activists (Rashid 
Ghannoushi, Muhammad Selim al-Awa, Yusuf Qardawi, Mahmud Ayoub, 
Anwar Ibrahim. Kamal Aboul Magd, Fahmy Howeidy, Abdurahman Wahid, 
Nurcholish Madjid, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Fathi Osman) have produced a 




























































































issues of pluralism both at the theoretical and practical levels. Recognizing the 
need to open up the one party or authoritarian political systems that prevail as 
well as face the multi-religious and multicultural demographic realities of their 
societies, they have both reinterpreted Islamic principles to reconcile Islam with 
democratization and multiparty political systems and recast and expanded 
traditional doctrine regarding the status (dhimmi) of nonoMuslim minorities. In 
addition to employing traditional concepts like consultation (shura) and 
consensus (ijma) to limit the authority of rulers, words like party (hizb, party) 
have been reinterpreted, acknowledging a positive connotation and applying it to 
political parties (Hizb Ennahda)and religious groups (Hizbollah) rather than that 
of difference and division which undermine rather than promote the good of 
society.
Islamists and other Muslim intellectuals have marshaled scripture and 
history to argue that Islam supports the equality and pluralism of the human 
community. Quranic passages which affirm that God chose to create the world 
with different nations and tribes (Sura 5:48, 30:22, 48:13) are emphasized. They 
argue that the pluralism of the Quran was in fact practiced by Muhammad and 
the early community in its recognition of and extension of freedom of religion, 
worship, and protection (dhimmi) to non-Muslims. Some, like Professor 
Mahmoud Ayoub, assert that rather than implying a second-class citizenship, the 
word dhimma (which is not in the Quran but found in the hadith) was intended 
to designate a special covenant of protection between Muslims, on the one hand 
and Christians and Jews, on the other. Others note that the term dhimma refers to 
the form of a covenant not its content and that content can be redefined today in 
light of new realities.
Increasingly, both the writings of Muslim intellectuals and the experience 
of Islam in Southeast Asia become more relevant to the broader Muslim world. 
The multireligious and multiethnic societies of Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and 
Singapore in diverse ways provide a substantial example of pluralism — the 
issues, problems and possibilities for change, accommodation, and coexistence. 
While Malaysia did experience Malay-Chinese riots in 1969, Malaysians 
continue to construct a Muslim majority society in which non-Muslims have 
enjoyed a degree of political and religious equality as well as democracy 
unknown in many parts of the Muslim world. Indonesia's de-politicization of 
Islam has ironically engendered both a deeper Islamization of Indonesian society 
and a diverse group of voices (Muslim and Christian) committed to a pluralist 
society. The conflicts and contradictions of this process were seen strikingly 
during the last days of Soeharto in the scapegoating and attacks on Chinese. 
They have been equally visible in the and Muslim-Christian conflicts in 1999 




























































































of the Nahdatul Ulama, a religious organization with more than 30 million 
members and a champion of religious and political pluralism.
Just as Muslim politics reveal the profound debate and conflict over issues 
of political liberalization, democratization, pluralism, the rights of women and 
minorities, so too a generation of Muslim intellectuals and leaders is attempting 
to reexamine and reinterpret their faith in light of modern realities debating 
many of these critical questions. Whether this new current will prevail in the 
face of authoritarian regimes, conservative religious authorities, and secular 
forces remains to be seen.
The Empowerment of Muslim Women
Islamic activists and intellectuals have in recent years engaged in a reassessment 
of women's status and role in society. They represent a range of positions. If 
some advocate a restoration of past practices, others opt for a process of 
reformation, emphasizing not only greater gender equality in worship and piety 
but also in education and employment. As previously noted, Islamic movements 
like the Muslim Brotherhoods of Egypt and Jordan and Tunisia's Ennahda have 
emphasized increased access to education and employment. Women are 
becoming more visible in the councils of Islamic organizations. Islamist women 
are increasingly found in the professions (physicians, journalists, lawyers, 
engineers, social workers, university professors) and as administrators and staff 
in schools, clinics, and social welfare agencies.
Today Muslim women, representing many ideological orientations, are 
increasingly writing and speaking out for themselves on women's issues. They 
seek to empower themselves not just as defenders of women's rights but as 
interpreters of the tradition. Many argue that patriarchy as much as religion, 
indeed patriarchy linked to religion, accounts for many customs affecting gender 
relations which became long-standing traditions. The primary interpreters of 
Islam (of the Quran, traditions of the Prophet, and law) were males functioning 
in and reflecting the values of patriarchal societies. Religion was linked to 
patriarchy both through its interpreter-scholars and their appeal to Islam to 
legitimate their interpretations or formulations of doctrine and law.
Women scholars and activists draw on the writings and thought not only 
of male scholars but also, and most importantly, a growing number of Muslim 
women scholars and activists who utilize an Islamic discourse to address issues 
ranging from dress and education to employment and political participation. In 
areas as diverse as the Arab world, Iran, South and Southeast Asia, women have 
formed their own women's organizations, created their own magazines and 




























































































interpretations and visions of gender relations. Organizations like Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws (Geneva) and Sisters in Islam (Malaysia) have 
become visible and vocal representatives within their own countries and 
internationally, writing, publishing, speaking out and participating in 
international conferences such as the Cairo conference on population and 
Beijing's conference on women. Though small in number, they may well, as has 
occurred in other religions, prove to be an effective vanguard in a long term 
process of reassessment, reform and transformation.
Conclusion
Today, we are witnessing a new historical transformation in the Muslim world 
as many seeking more autonomy and broader participation in public life, pursue 
greater political participation and/or develop institutions of civil society. Risks 
exist, for there can be no “risk free democracy.” Those who fear the unknown, 
what specific Islamic movements in power will be like or how they will act, 
have a legitimate concern. However, if we fear their suppression of opposition, 
lack of pluralism and tolerance, and violation of human rights, then the same 
concern must apply equally to the plight of those Islamists who have shown a 
willingness to participate within the political process under current regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, and Yemen where the results of free 
parliamentary elections and the institutions of civil society (non-state political 
organization, professional associations, NGOs, financial institutions, the press 
and media) have been undermined or aborted. It is equally important to note that 
Islamist governments (the Taliban in Afghanistan, the NIF-backed government 
in Sudan, and Khomeini's Iran) are vivid reminders that religious 
authoritarianism is as dangerous as secular authoritarianism.
Governments in the Muslim world, who espouse political liberalization 
and democracy, are challenged to promote and strengthen the development of 
civil society — those institutions, values, and culture that are the foundation for 
true participatory government. They must be willing to allow alternative 
political voices to function freely in society and express their opinions and 
dissent through the formation of political parties, private associations, 
newspapers, and the media. Islamic activists and movements are challenged to 
move beyond slogans to programs. They must become more self critical in 
speaking out not only against local government abuses but also against those of 
Islamic regimes in Sudan, Afghanistan, and until recently Iran as well as acts of 
terrorism committed in the name of Islam by extremists. They are challenged to 
provide an Islamic rationale and policy that would extend to their opposition and 
to minorities the very principles of pluralism and political participation which 
they demand for themselves. The extent to which the growth of Islamic 




























































































women's rights and their public roles, the recent record of discrimination against 
the Bahai in Iran, the Ahmadi in Pakistan, and Christians in Sudan as well as 
sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians in Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan 
and Nigeria pose serious questions of religious pluralism, human rights, and 
tolerance.
The contemporary Islamic revival has challenged many of the 
presupposition of Western liberal secularism and development theory that 
modernization means the inexorable or progressive secularization and 
Westernization of society. Too often analysis and policymaking have been 
shaped by a liberal secularism which fails to recognize that it too represents a 
worldview, not the worldview or paradigm, and can easily degenerate into a 
“secularist fundamentalism” which assumes its principles to be a self-evident 
and universal truth or norm. Thus alternative worldviews or ideologies are easily 
dismissed as abnormal, deviant, irrational, and a “fundamentalist” or extremist 
threat.
Several factors must be kept in mind when speaking of the compatibility 
or incompatibility of Islam and democracy. Those who argue a priori that Islam 
and democracy are incompatible must recall that the same could be said, and 
indeed was said, by a variety of secular and religious intellectuals and leaders in 
the past about Judaism and Christianity. Both these traditions, their beliefs and 
values, were formulated long before modem democracy and, indeed, were used 
in the past to support and legitimate non-democratic states and empires, from 
divine right monarchies to forms of dictatorship in which notions of modern 
pluralism and human rights were unknown. Yet, both Judaism and Christianity, 
like all of the world's religions have historically proven to be open to 
reformulation and change as the sacred texts and beliefs of the religious tradition 
are adapted and applied in changing historical contexts. As a result, many 
believers today, lacking an historical awareness of the development of their 
traditions, believe that Judaism and Christianity are not only not incompatible 
but even are the sources of western democratic traditions. The Muslim world 
also knew pre-modern authoritarianism, followed by European colonialism 
which, despite its protestations of a “mission to civilize,” was not motivated by a 
desire to promote civil society and democratization. Moreover, as noted above, 
the emergence of modern Muslim states saw authoritarian rulers often placed on 
their thrones of power by European colonial powers. Europe along with 
America, despite its official commitment to the spread of democracy, continued 
to tolerate and support dictatorships and authoritarian rule in the Muslim world 
(as in many other parts of the developing world) during the post-independence 
and Cold war periods out of self interest to block the spread of communism or to 




























































































With regard to the compatibility of Islamic belief and values with 
democracy, some Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, assert their incompatibility. 
They range from the conservative monarchy of King Fahd in Saudi Arabia, who 
sees democracy as a western concept incommensurate with Islamic traditions, to 
militant movements like Hizb al-Tahrir. Many others in the worldwide Muslim 
community believe that Islam is capable of reinterpretation (ijtihad) and that 
traditional concepts of consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), and legal 
principles such as the general welfare (maslaha) provide the bases for the 
development of modern Muslim notions or authentic, more indigenously-rooted, 
versions of democracy. Some reinterpret traditional beliefs to essentially 
legitimate western generated forms of democracy; others wish to develop their 
own more indigenously rooted forms of political participation and democracy 
appropriate to Islamic values and realities.
The history of Islam's generating and supporting new intellectual 
traditions as well as government and social institutions is a matter of record. 
Here it is important to remind those who speak of democracy as if it were a self 
evident truth, uni vocal in meaning and expressed in a single model, that (1) the 
introduction of democracy was accompanied by much skepticism among many 
rulers, elites, and religious leaders alike and (2) the western experience has 
known many forms of democracy from Athens to modern western 
interpretations and models operative in Europe and America. It would be more 
correct when speaking of democratization in global politics or, more 
specifically, of Islam and democracy to first ask “which democracy”? The 
existence of different meanings and understandings of democratization as well 
as the danger of exploitation of democracy by authoritarian governments and 
demagogues alike must be seen as neither foreign to the West nor to other 
societies.
In the final analysis, as is self-evident, it will remain for Muslims to 
determine the nature of their governments, to introduce or refine forms of 
political participation or democratization that seem appropriate. While there may 
be much room for differences and debate, the challenge today is for all parties or 
factions, despite political and ideological differences, to commit themselves to 
the creation and strengthening of the culture, values, and institutions of civil 
society.
John L. Esposito
Director, Center for Muslim-Christian 
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